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Abstract
We analyze a two-receiver binary-input discrete memoryless broadcast channel, in which the trans-
mitter communicates a common message simultaneously to both receivers and a covert message to only
one of them. The unintended recipient of the covert message is treated as an adversary who attempts
to detect the covert transmission. This model captures the problem of embedding covert messages in
an innocent codebook and generalizes previous covert communication models in which the innocent
behavior corresponds to the absence of communication between legitimate users. We identify the exact
asymptotic behavior of the number of covert bits that can be transmitted when the rate of the innocent
codebook is close to the capacity of the channel to the adversary. Our results also identify the dependence
of the number of covert bits on the channel parameters and the characteristics of the innocent codebook.
I. INTRODUCTION
In certain scenarios, the very intention to communicate can be considered as a violation resulting
in dire consequences. Consequently, many techniques such as spread-spectrum communications have
been developed to ensure communication with Low Probability of Detection (LPD) also known as
covert communication. There has been a renewed interest to study the information theoretic limits of
LPD, especially after Bash et al. [2] showed that covert communication over a point-to-point channel
is subject to the square-root law. They showed that the transmitter can only send O (√n) bits over n
channel uses without being detected by the adversary. Several subsequent works have led to a complete
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2characterization of the information-theoretic limits of covert communication over point-to-point classical
channels. While the results of [3, 4] established a tight first-order asymptotic characterization of the
covert throughput over point-to-point channels, [5] refined the results with second-order asymptotics for
different covertness metrics. Results of [4, 6] highlighted the conditions required to achieve keyless
LPD communication over Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMCs) and Binary Symmetric Channels
(BSCs), respectively. Furthermore, other works have analyzed covert communication over multiple-
access channels [7], broadcast channels [1, 8], relay channels [9, 10], and timing channels [11, 12].
A few other works have analyzed scenarios in which the square-root law does not apply; for instance,
scenarios in which the adversary is uncertain about the channel parameters [13, 14] or timing of the
transmission [15, 16]. In addition, there have also been efforts to construct explicit codes for covert
communication [17]–[20].
All the above works define covert communication with respect to (w.r.t.) an innocent behavior in
which the transmitter does not communicate. In contrast, we analyze a scenario in which the innocent
behavior corresponds to the transmission of codewords from an innocent codebook that is permitted
and decoded by the adversary. The work of Dutta et al. [21] on covert communication using dirty
constellations is one of the motivations for the present work. In [21], the authors rely on channel noise
and equipment imperfections to hide a covert signal by superimposing it on top of an innocent signal
while incurring minimal distortion; consequently, the informed receiver can decode the covert message
while the uninformed adversary attributes the distortion of the signal to channel impairments and hardware
imperfections. Although the authors show that their message-hiding scheme is immune to certain statistical
tests, their scheme is not fundamentally covert against a more powerful adversary. Our objective is to
develop an information-theoretic analysis of embedding covert signals in innocent communication signals
while escaping detection from an adversary who is not restricted to using a small set of statistical tests.
Our model relates to several previous works. It can be viewed as an instance of steganography [22], in
which part of the covertext is controlled through the design of a coding scheme and another part stems
from the channel noise that is only statistically known. The model that is closest to the one considered in
this work is that of [23], which analyzes a broadcast setup for BSCs and exploits the additive nature of the
noise in BSCs. Tan and Lee [8] also analyzed covert communication over broadcast channels, but their
channel model differs from the one considered in this work. In [8], the authors study the covert capacity
region for a broadcast channel model in which the transmitter simultaneously sends two different covert
messages to two legitimate users while escaping detection from a third user and showed that time-division
transmission is optimal. In contrast, our model considers two receivers, one of which tries to detect the
presence of a covert message besides decoding the common message.
3We build upon the channel resolvability techniques developed in [4, 7] for point-to-point channels and
multiple-access channels (MACs), respectively, to embed covert information into innocent transmissions.
In particular, we show that the transmitter can perturb no more than O (√n) symbols of the n-length
sequences representing the innocent transmission to remain covert from the adversary. We precisely
characterize the asymptotic behavior of the number of covert bits that can be transmitted when the rate
of the innocent transmission approaches the capacity of the channel to the adversary. This characterization
highlights the dependence of the number of covert bits on the channel parameters and the characteristics
of the innocent codebook. We provide an achievability proof, a detailed converse proof, and specialize
our results to a BSC, all of which were omitted in [1].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we set the notation used in the
paper, and in Section III, we formally introduce our channel model. In Section IV, we develop a
preliminary result that captures the essence of our approach to embedding covert information in innocent
transmissions. Finally, we present our main result in Section V, which consists in an achievability and a
converse characterizing the optimal asymptotic number of reliable and covert bits.
II. NOTATION
We denote random variables and their realizations in upper and lower case, respectively. All sequences
in boldface are n-length sequences, where n ∈ N∗, unless specified otherwise. A sequence of random
variables (Yj , Yj+1, . . . , Yk) is denoted by Ykj . The element at position ` ∈ J1, nK of a sequence xj is
denoted by xj,`. We interpret log and exp to the base e; the results can be interpreted in bits by converting
log to the base 2. Adhering to standard information-theoretic notation, H(X) and I(X;Y ) represent
the average entropy of X and the average mutual information between X and Y , respectively. If the
distribution of X is P and the channel between X and Y is WY |X , then I
(
P,WY |X
)
also represents the
average mutual information between X and Y . For x ∈ [0, 1], Hb (x) denotes the average binary entropy
of x. For two distributions P and Q on the same finite alphabet X , the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence
is D(P‖Q) ,∑x P (x) log P (x)Q(x) , the variational distance is V(P,Q) , 12 ∑x |P (x)−Q(x)|, and the chi-
squared distance is χ2 (P‖Q) ,
∑
x
(P (x)−Q(x))2
Q(x) . Pinsker’s inequality states that V(P,Q)
2 6 12D(P‖Q).
If P is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Q, we write P  Q.
III. CHANNEL MODEL
We analyze a channel model in which Alice, the transmitter, communicates a common message to
both Bob, the receiver, and Willie, the warden, and a covert message to Bob alone over a discrete
memoryless broadcast channel
(X ,WY Z|X ,Y,Z). We assume that the transmitter uses a binary input
4alphabet X , {0, 1} and that the output alphabets Y and Z are finite. Furthermore, we assume that all
terminals are synchronized and possess complete knowledge of the coding scheme used.
As illustrated in Figure 1, Alice wishes to communicate a uniformly distributed common message
W2 ∈ J1,M2K to both Bob and Willie, and a uniformly distributed covert message W1 ∈ J1,M1K to
Bob alone. Alice may also choose not to transmit any covert message, in which case, she sets W1 = 0.
She then encodes the message pair (W1,W2) = (i, j) into an n-length codeword Xij . We label the
collection of codewords {X0j}M2j=1 as the innocent codebook. Alice sends the codeword over the discrete
memoryless broadcast channel in n channel uses, at the end of which, Bob and Willie observe the
n-length sequences Y and Z, respectively. Since the channel is memoryless, we denote the transition
probability corresponding to n uses of the channel by W ⊗nY Z|X ,
∏n
i=1WY Z|X . For a ∈ X , we denote
the output distributions induced by each input symbol at Bob and Willie by Pa(y) , WY |X(y|a) and
Qa(z) , WZ|X(z|a), respectively. For a, b ∈ X with a 6= b, we assume Pa  Pb, Qa  Qb, Qa 6= Qb.
Without the first assumption, Bob has an unfair advantage over Willie [4]. Without the second and third
assumptions, achieving covert communication becomes either impossible or trivial [3, 4]. We also make
the following assumptions.
• The channel
(X ,WZ|X ,Z) to Willie admits a unique capacity-achieving input distribution Λ, for
which Λ(1) , λ∗, where λ∗ > 0. Many channels encountered in practice satisfy this assumption.1
• I
(
Λ,WY |X
)
> I
(
Λ,WZ|X
)
, so that Willie limits the rate of the common message.
Upon observing the noisy sequence Z, Willie forms an estimate W˜2 of W2. We measure reliability at
1Note that this assumption is required to prove only the converse.
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Fig. 1. Model of covert communication over a discrete memoryless broadcast channel for a fixed common message W2 = j.
5Willie using the following metric,
P (2)e ,
1
M2
M2∑
j=1
P
(2)
e,j , EW2
(
P
(2)
e,W2
)
, (1)
where
P
(2)
e,j , P
(
W˜2 6= j|W1 = 0,W2 = j
)
+ P
(
W˜2 6= j|W1 6= 0,W2 = j
)
. (2)
Strictly speaking, P (2)e is not a probability measure; however, a small P
(2)
e ensures that the average
decoding error probability of the common message at Willie is small regardless of the presence of W1.
Note that there is no prior on whether W1 = 0 or W1 6= 0. Willie attempts to detect the presence of
a non-zero covert message by performing a binary-hypothesis test on his observation Z to distinguish
between the hypotheses H0 , {W1 = 0} and H1 , {W1 6= 0}. We denote Willie’s Type I and Type II
errors by α and β, respectively. For a fixed W2 = j, the output distribution observed by Willie is
Qnj (z) ,W ⊗nZ|X (z|x0j) , if W1 = 0, (3)
Q̂nj (z) ,
1
M1
M1∑
i=1
W ⊗nZ|X (z|xij) , else. (4)
For a fixed common message W2 = j, we measure the covertness of W1 by the KL divergence
D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
since any statistical test [24] conducted on Z by Willie must satisfy α+β > 1−
√
D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
.
A vanishing KL divergence ensures that α+β = 1 in the limit, so that Willie’s statistical test is no better
than a random guess making the test futile in detecting the presence of a covert message.
Upon observing Y, Bob forms an estimate (Ŵ1, Ŵ2) of the transmitted message pair (W1,W2). We
measure reliability at Bob using the metric
P (1)e ,
1
M2
M2∑
j=1
(
P
(1)
e,1,j + P
(1)
e,2,j
)
, (5)
, EW2
(
P
(1)
e,1,W2
)
+ EW2
(
P
(1)
e,2,W2
)
, (6)
where
P
(1)
e,1,j , P
(
Ŵ2 6= j|W1 = 0,W2 = j
)
+ P
(
Ŵ2 6= j|W1 6= 0,W2 = j
)
, (7)
P
(1)
e,2,j , P
(
Ŵ1 6= 0|W1 = 0, Ŵ2 = W2 = j
)
+ P
(
Ŵ1 6= W1|W1 6= 0, Ŵ2 = W2 = j
)
. (8)
Despite P (1)e not being an error probability in the strict sense, a small P
(1)
e guarantees that the average
error probability of the covert message and the common message at Bob is small.
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Fig. 2. Binary asymmetric channel VX|X and an illustration of innocent symbols flipped by the channel VX|X .
Our main objective is to characterize the optimal scaling of logM1 and logM2 with n such that
lim
n→∞P
(1)
e = limn→∞P
(2)
e = 0, (9)
∀j ∈ J1,M2K, lim
n→∞D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
= 0. (10)
Note that we choose to satisfy the more stringent requirement that limn→∞D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
vanishes for
every j ∈ J1,M2K so that the hypothesis test used by Willie is futile in detecting the presence of any
covert message for every choice of the common message and not just on average.
A couple of comments are now in order. First, note that our goal is twofold here: we wish to design a
reliable code to communicate a common message and a reliable code to embed a covert message; this is a
joint code-design problem, and we do not address the problem of embedding covert bits into a fixed code
for the common message. Second, the problem generalizes previous works on covert communication, in
which covertness was measured w.r.t. the innocent distribution Q⊗n0 corresponding to the transmission of
the all-zero sequence. In our case, for W2 = j ∈ J1,M2K, covertness is measured w.r.t. the distribution Qnj ,
which is a product distribution that is not identically distributed and corresponds to the communication
of the innocent codeword mapped to the common message W2 = j.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
Following the approach put forward in [4], we define a covert stochastic process, which serves as the
target distribution that our covert code approximates. By introducing the covert process, we precisely
quantify the fraction of symbols in the innocent codeword that Alice can perturb to transmit covert
information while simultaneously avoiding detection by Willie. For a fixed n ∈ N∗ and a sequence
x ∈ X n, we define the covert process as the output of the binary asymmetric channel VX|X illustrated
7in Figure 2 such that VX|X(1|0) , αn and VX|X(0|1) , βn, where αn, βn ∈ (0, 1) are cross-over
probabilities. We denote the distribution of the covert process by Πx,αn,βn defined as
Πx,αn,βn(x) ,
n∏
i=1
VX|X (xi|xi) . (11)
We set γn , βnαn , and when defining a sequence {γn}n∈N∗ , we ask that it converges to γ ∈ R+. The
transmission of the covert process through the DMCs
(X ,WY |X ,Y) and (X ,WZ|X ,Z) induces the
output distributions
P ⊗nx,αn,βn(y) ,
∑
x
W ⊗nY |X (y|x) Πx,αn,βn(x), (12)
Q⊗nx,αn,βn(z) ,
∑
x
W ⊗nZ|X (z|x) Πx,αn,βn(x), (13)
at Bob and Willie, respectively. Note that both P ⊗nx,αn,βn and Q
⊗n
x,αn,βn
are product distributions, and setting
both αn and βn to 0 results in a distribution Q⊗nx,0,0 at Willie. We now have the following generalization
of [4, Lemma 1].
Lemma 1. Let αn, βn ∈ (0, 1) be such that limn→∞ αn = limn→∞ βn = 0. Let x ∈ X n and set
λn ,
∑n
i=1
1{xi=1}
n . Then, for a large n ∈ N∗, we bound D
(
Q⊗nx,αn,βn‖Q⊗nx,0,0
)
by
n
(
(1− λn) α
2
n
2
(1 +
√
αn)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λnβ
2
n
2
(
1 +
√
βn
)
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
)
> D
(
Q⊗nx,αn,βn‖Q⊗nx,0,0
)
> n
(
(1− λn) α
2
n
2
(1−√αn)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λnβ
2
n
2
(
1−
√
βn
)
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
)
.
(14)
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix A. For any x, upon choosing sequences {αn}n∈N∗
and {βn}n∈N∗ , such that limn→∞ nα2n = limn→∞ nβ2n = 0, we obtain
lim
n→∞D
(
Q⊗nx,αn,βn‖Q⊗nx,0,0
)
= 0, (15)
which shows that Q⊗nx,αn,βn is indistinguishable from Q
⊗n
x,0,0 at Willie when the fraction of flips is small
enough. In addition, it is also possible to choose {αn}n∈N∗ and {βn}n∈N∗ such that limn→∞ nαn =
limn→∞ nβn = ∞ to flip an infinite number of innocent symbols as n → ∞, while still ensuring that
Q⊗nx,αn,βn is indistinguishable from Q
⊗n
x,0,0 according to (14). If we set x = x0j , where x0j is the innocent
codeword corresponding to W2 = j, the distribution Q⊗nx0j ,0,0 is the innocent distribution corresponding
to W2 = j and is equivalent to the distribution Qnj in (3).
8V. MAIN RESULT
We now characterize the exact scaling of the number of covert bits when the common message is
transmitted at a rate approaching the capacity of the channel to Willie. For the transmission of covert
bits without a secret key, Bob is required to possess a certain advantage over Willie, which we precisely
characterize in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For the channel model described in Section III, if there exists γ > 0 such that
(1− λ∗)D(P1‖P0) + λ∗γD(P0‖P1) > (1− λ∗)D(Q1‖Q0) + λ∗γD(Q0‖Q1), (16)
there exist keyless covert communication schemes such that
lim
n→∞
logM2
n
= I
(
Λ,WZ|X
)
, (17)
and for all j ∈ J1,M2K,
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
) = maxγ>0
√
2 ((1− λ∗)D(P1‖P0) + λ∗γD(P0‖P1))√
(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λ∗γ2χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
, (18)
lim
n→∞P
(1)
e = limn→∞P
(2)
e = limn→∞D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
= 0. (19)
Proof. We first show that Bob can decode the covert message, and both Bob and Willie can decode
the common message reliably. Using channel resolvability techniques, we then show that the induced
distribution Q̂nW2 corresponding to the common message W2 is indistinguishable from the covert stochastic
process Q⊗nx0W2 ,αn,βn when averaged over all choices of the common message W2. Finally, we identify a
coding scheme that achieves (17) and (18) such that (16) and (19) are satisfied.
a) Random code generation: Define a setDn , {x : |wt(x)n − λ∗| < }, where wt (x) , |` ∈ J1, nK : x` = 1|
is the weight of x. For j ∈ J1,M2K, we generate M2 codewords x0j ∈ X n independently at random
according to the distribution PnX defined by
PnX (x) ,
Λ⊗n (x)1{x ∈ Dn }
PΛ(X ∈ Dn )
(20)
Generating {x0j}M2j=1 according to PnX ensures that every x0j is -letter typical w.r.t. the distribution Λ.
We label this set of M2 codewords as the innocent codebook C2. For every W2 = j ∈ J1,M2K, we
generate M1 codewords independently at random according to the distribution Πx0j ,αn,βn and label this
set of codewords as the covert sub-codebook C1,j corresponding to the common message W2 = j. Alice
9encodes the message pair (W1,W2) = (i, j), where i ∈ J1,M1K and j ∈ J1,M2K, to the codeword
xij ∈ C1,j and transmits it through the discrete memoryless broadcast channel. Defining
WY |X(y|x) ,
∑
x
WY |X(y|x)VX|X(x|x), (21)
WZ|X(z|x) ,
∑
x
WZ|X(z|x)VX|X(x|x), (22)
we show that the decoding error probability of the common message at Bob and Willie averaged over
all random codebooks C decays exponentially in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any µ ∈ (0, 1) and n large enough, and
logM2 < (1− µ)nI
(
Λ,WY |X
)
, (23)
logM2 < (1− µ)nI
(
Λ,WZ|X
)
, (24)
we have
EC
(
EW2P
(1)
e,1,W2
)
6 exp (−ξ1n) , (25)
EC
(
EW2P
(2)
e,W2
)
6 exp (−ξ1n) , (26)
for an appropriate constant ξ1 > 0.
The proof of Lemma 2 follows the random coding argument outlined in [25, Section 7.3] and is omitted
here. Note that ∀(x, z) ∈ X × Z ,
WZ|X(z|x) = VX|X(0|x)Q0(z) + VX|X(1|x)Q1(z). (27)
Consequently, we have
WZ|X(z|0) = Q0(z) + αn (Q1(z)−Q0(z)) , (28)
WZ|X(z|1) = Q1(z) + βn (Q0(z)−Q1(z)) . (29)
Since limn→∞ αn = limn→∞ βn = 0, for a large n, the channels WZ|X and WZ|X are identical in
the limit of large blocklength. The same argument extends to channels WY |X and WY |X . Defining
QZ(z) ,
∑
x Λ(x)WZ|X(z|x) and expanding the mutual information term in (24) using (28) and (29),
we obtain
I
(
Λ,WZ|X
)
=
∑
z
(
(1− λ∗) (Q0(z) + αn (Q1(z)−Q0(z))) log
(
Q0(z) + αn (Q1(z)−Q0(z))
QZ(z)
)
+ λ∗ (Q1(z) + βn (Q0(z)−Q1(z))) log
(
Q1(z) + βn (Q0(z)−Q1(z))
QZ(z)
))
(30)
10
=
∑
z
(
(1− λ∗)Q0(z) log Q0(z)
QZ(z)
+ λ∗Q1(z) log
Q1(z)
QZ(z)
)
+O (αn) +O (βn) (31)
= I
(
Λ,WZ|X
)
+O (αn) +O (βn) . (32)
Similarly, we obtain
I
(
Λ,WY |X
)
= I
(
Λ,WY |X
)
+O (αn) +O (βn) . (33)
Combining (23), (24), (32), and (33), we obtain
logM2
n
< (1− µ) I(Λ,WY |X)+O (αn) +O (βn) , (34)
logM2
n
< (1− µ) I(Λ,WZ|X)+O (αn) +O (βn) . (35)
Our assumption that I
(
Λ,WY |X
)
> I
(
Λ,WZ|X
)
and (35) render (34) unnecessary. Hence, the average
decoding error probability of the common message at both Bob and Willie vanishes in the limit of large
blocklength if
lim
n→∞
logM2
n
= (1− ξ) I(Λ,WZ|X), (36)
for an arbitrary ξ > 0. Henceforth, we assume that both Bob and Willie have decoded the common
message successfully.
b) Channel reliability analysis: We now prove that the decoding error probability of the covert
message at Bob decays exponentially. For i ∈ J1,M1K, the following events lead to a decoding error at
Bob,
• codeword x0j is transmitted, and the decoder incorrectly estimates Ŵ1 = i,
• codeword xij is transmitted, and the decoder incorrectly estimates Ŵ1 = 0,
• codeword xij is transmitted, and the decoder incorrectly estimates Ŵ1 = i′ ∈ J1,M1K, where i′ 6= i.
The decoding error probability of the covert message at Bob averaged over all random codebooks satisfies
the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For any µ ∈ (0, 1), an n large enough, and
logM1 =(1− µ)n((1− λ∗)αnD(P1‖P0)+λ∗βnD(P0‖P1)), (37)
we have
EC
(
EW2P
(1)
e,2,W2
)
6 exp (−ξ2nαn) + exp (−ξ2nβn) , (38)
for an appropriate ξ2 > 0.
The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix B.
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c) Channel resolvability analysis: We now show that the KL divergence between the induced
distribution Q̂nW2 and the covert stochastic process Q
⊗n
X0W2 ,αn,βn
averaged over all choices of the common
message and all random codebooks vanishes in the limit of large blocklength.
Lemma 4. For any ν > 0, an n large enough, and
logM1 =(1 + ν)n((1− λ∗)αnD(Q1‖Q0)+λ∗βnD(Q0‖Q1)), (39)
we have
EC
(
EW2D
(
Q̂nW2‖Q⊗nX0W2 ,αn,βn
))
6exp (−ξ3nαn) + exp (−ξ3nβn) , (40)
for an appropriate ξ3 > 0.
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix C.
d) Identification of a specific code: Using Markov’s inequality, we obtain
P
(
EW2P
(1)
e,1,W2
< 8EC
(
EW2P
(1)
e,1,W2
)⋂
EW2P
(1)
e,2,W2
< 8EC
(
EW2P
(1)
e,2,W2
)⋂
EW2P
(2)
e,W2
< 8EC
(
EW2P
(2)
e,W2
)
⋂
EW2D
(
Q̂nW2‖Q⊗nx0W2 ,αn,βn
)
< 8EC
(
EW2D
(
Q̂nW2‖Q⊗nX0W2 ,αn,βn
)))
> 1
2
. (41)
Defining n , exp (−ξ4nαn)+exp (−ξ4nβn) for an appropriate constant ξ4 > 0, we conclude from (41)
that there exists at least one coding scheme C∗ such that for a large n,
EW2P
(1)
e,1,W2
6 n, (42)
EW2P
(1)
e,2,W2
6 n, (43)
EW2P
(2)
e,W2
6 n, (44)
EW2D
(
Q̂nW2‖Q⊗nx0W2 ,αn,βn
)
6 n, (45)
where x0W2 ∈ C∗2 is the codeword corresponding to the common message W2. We expurgate half of the
innocent codewords and their corresponding covert sub-codebooks such that for every remaining W2 = j,
we have
P
(1)
e,1,j 6 8n, (46)
P
(1)
e,2,j 6 8n, (47)
P
(2)
e,j 6 8n, (48)
D
(
Q̂nj ‖Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn
)
6 8n, (49)
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without affecting the asymptotic rate of the common message. Note that covertness is not affected by ex-
purgating whole covert sub-codebooks. Since limn→∞ n = 0, (46), (47), and (48) imply limn→∞ P
(1)
e =
limn→∞ P
(2)
e = 0.
Using Pinsker’s inequality with (49) ensures that V
(
Q̂nj , Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
)
6 exp (−ξ5nαn)+exp (−ξ5nβn)
for an appropriate ξ5 > 0. Then, we write
D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
=D
(
Q̂nj ‖Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn
)
+ D
(
Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn‖Q⊗nx0j ,0,0
)
+
∑
z
(
Q̂nj (z)−Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn(z)
)
log
Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn(z)
Q⊗nx0j ,0,0(z)
. (50)
We bound the absolute value of the last term in (50) for a large n by∣∣∣∣∣∑
z
(
Q̂nj (z)−Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn (z)
)
log
Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn (z)
Q⊗nx0j ,0,0 (z)
∣∣∣∣∣ (a)6 exp (−ξ6nαn) + exp (−ξ6nβn) , (51)
for an appropriate ξ6 > 0, where (a) follows from using steps similar to [7, (249)-(254)]. Combining (49)
to (51), we conclude that for a large n,∣∣∣D(Q̂nj ‖Qnj )− D(Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn‖Q⊗nx0j ,0,0)∣∣∣ 6 exp (−ξ7nαn) + exp (−ξ7nβn) , (52)
for an appropriate constant ξ7 > 0.
e) Asymptotic behavior: We now establish the asymptotic scaling of logM1 for the proposed covert
communication scheme. Combining (14) and (52), for a fixed W2 = j, we bound D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
by
D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
6 n
(
(1− λ∗)α
2
n
2
(1 +
√
αn)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λ∗β
2
n
2
(
1 +
√
βn
)
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
)
+ exp (−ξ7nαn) + exp (−ξ7nβn) . (53)
D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
> n
(
(1− λ∗)α
2
n
2
(1−√αn)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λ∗β
2
n
2
(
1−
√
βn
)
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
)
− exp (−ξ7nαn)− exp (−ξ7nβn) . (54)
Ultimately, combining (37), (39), (53), and (54), and taking the limit as n→∞, we obtain
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
) 6 √2 (1− µ) (1− λ∗)D(P1‖P0) + λ∗γD(P0‖P1)√
(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λ∗γ2χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
, (55)
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
) > √2 (1 + ν) (1− λ∗)D(Q1‖Q0) + λ∗γD(Q0‖Q1)√
(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λ∗γ2χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
. (56)
Theorem 2. For the channel model described in Section III, consider a sequence of codes with increasing
block length n such that limn→∞ P
(1)
e = limn→∞ P
(2)
e = 0, and for all j ∈ J1,M2K, limn→∞D(Q̂nj ‖Qnj ) = 0.
13
If the common message is transmitted using a codebook that achieves the capacity of the channel to Willie,
then for every j ∈ J1,M2K, we obtain
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
) 6 maxγ>0 √2 (1− λ∗)D(P1‖P0) + λ∗γD(P0‖P1)√(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λ∗γ2χ2 (Q0‖Q1) . (57)
For a sequence of schemes such that (57) holds with equality and for some γ∗ that maximizes the right
hand side of (57), we obtain
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
) > √2 (1− λ∗)D(Q1‖Q0) + λ∗γ∗D(Q0‖Q1)√
(1− λ∗)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λ∗ (γ∗)2 χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
. (58)
Proof. Consider a capacity-achieving codebook C∗ for the channel between Alice and Willie. For a
fixed common message W2 = j, consider a covert communication scheme that is characterized by
n,j , P
(
Ŵ1 6= W1|W2 = j
)
and δn,j , D
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
. Note that limn→∞ n,j = limn→∞ δn,j = 0. We
denote the innocent codeword corresponding to W2 = j by x0j = (x0j,1, x0j,2, . . . , x0j,n), the innocent
symbol at position ` by x0j,`, and the information symbol at position ` by xc0j,` , 1− x0j,`. For a fixed
W2 = j, we denote the input distribution of the sequence x0j by Πnj , where the distribution of the symbol
at position ` is defined by
Πj,`(x
c
0j,`) = 1−Πj,`(x0j,`) = µ(n)j,` . (59)
We interpret µ(n)j,` as the probability of flipping innocent symbol x0j,` to information symbol x
c
0j,` at
symbol position ` ∈ J1, nK. Note that the innocent symbol x0j,` depends on the choice of the common
message W2 = j and the symbol position ` ∈ J1, nK. For conciseness, we define the following terms.
P 0j,`(y) ,WY |X(y|x0j,`), P 1j,`(y) ,WY |X(y|xc0j,`), (60)
Q0j,`(z) ,WZ|X(z|x0j,`), Q1j,`(z) ,WZ|X(z|xc0j,`). (61)
Define Kj,`(z) , Q1j,`(z)−Q0j,`(z). Note that ∀z ∈ Z , Kj,`(z) equals either Q1(z)−Q0(z) or Q0(z)−
Q1(z) depending on the choices of j and `. Defining K(z) ,
∣∣∣Q1j,`(z)−Q0j,`(z)∣∣∣, we remove the
dependency of K(z) on j and `. We then define the distribution of each symbol Z` of Z by Q̂j,`, where
Q̂j,`(z) ,
∑
x
Πj,`(x)WZ|X(z|x) (62)
= Q0j,`(z) + µ
(n)
j,` Kj,`(z). (63)
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Let us now analyze the KL divergence between Q̂nj and Q
n
j .
δn,j =
∑
z
Q̂nj (z) log
Q̂nj (z)
Qnj (z)
(64)
= −H(Z|W2 = j)−
∑
z
Q̂nj (z) logQ
n
j (z) (65)
=
n∑
`=1
(
−H
(
Z`|Z`−11 ,W2 =j
)
−
∑
z
Q̂j,`(z)logQ
0
j,`(z)
)
(66)
>
n∑
`=1
(
−H(Z`|W2 = j)−
∑
z
Q̂j,`(z) logQ
0
j,`(z)
)
(67)
=
n∑
`=1
D
(
Q̂j,`‖Q0j,`
)
(68)
Since limn→∞ δn,j = 0 and KL divergence terms are non-negative, we obtain limn→∞D
(
Q̂j,`‖Q0j,`
)
= 0
for all ` ∈ J1, nK. Using Pinsker’s inequality, we obtain limn→∞V(Q̂j,`, Q0j,`) = 0, which implies that
∀z ∈ Z and ∀` ∈ J1, nK,
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣Q̂j,`(z)−Q0j,`(z)∣∣∣ = 0, (69)
lim
n→∞µ
(n)
j,` K(z) = 0. (70)
However, there exists at least one z ∈ Z such that K(z) 6= 0. Hence, we obtain limn→∞ µ(n)j,` = 0. Next,
define
Ψ
(n)
j,` (z) , µ
(n)
j,` Kj,`(z), (71)
ξ
(n)
j,` (z) ,
Ψ
(n)
j,` (z)
Q0j,`(z)
+
4
3
∣∣∣Ψ(n)j,` (z)∣∣∣
Q0j,`(z)
, (72)
ξ
(n)
j (z) , max
`∈J1,nK ξ(n)j,` (z). (73)
Since limn→∞ µ
(n)
j,` = 0, we infer that limn→∞Ψ
(n)
j,` (z) = limn→∞ ξ
(n)
j,` (z) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and
` ∈ J1, nK. Consequently, limn→∞ ξ(n)j (z) = 0, ∀z ∈ Z . Continuing the analysis of δn,j from (68), we
have, for n large enough,
δn,j >
n∑
`=1
∑
z
Q̂j,`(z) log
1 + µ(n)j,` Kj,`(z)
Q0j,`(z)
 (74)
(a)
>
n∑
`=1
∑
z
(
Ψ
(n)
j,` (z)
)2
2Q0j,`(z)
1−Ψ(n)j,` (z)
Q0j,`(z)
−
4
∣∣∣Ψ(n)j,` (z)∣∣∣
3Q0j,`(z)
 (75)
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=
n∑
`=1
∑
z
(
Ψ
(n)
j,` (z)
)2
2Q0j,`(z)
(
1− ξ(n)j,` (z)
)
(76)
>
∑
z
(
1− ξ(n)j (z)
) n∑
`=1
(
Ψ
(n)
j,` (z)
)2
2Q0j,`(z)
, (77)
where (a) follows from the fact that log(1 + x) > x − x22 , for x > 0, log(1 + x) > x − x
2
2 +
2x3
3 , for
x ∈ [−12 , 0], and ∑z Ψ(n)j,` = 0. Then, we define
nj,1 , wt (x0j) , nj,0 , n− nj,1, (78)
ρ
(n)
j,0 ,
∑n
`=1
`:x0j,`=0
µ
(n)
j,`
nj,0
, ρ
(n)
j,1 ,
∑n
`=1
`:x0j,`=1
µ
(n)
j,`
nj,1
, (79)
γ
(n)
j ,
ρ
(n)
j,1
ρ
(n)
j,0
, λ
(n)
j ,
nj,1
n
, (80)
where nj,0 and nj,1 denote the number of 0’s and 1’s in x0j , respectively; ρ
(n)
j,0 is the average probability of
flipping 0 to 1 and ρ(n)j,1 is the average probability of flipping 1 to 0. Note that limn→∞ ρ
(n)
j,0 = limn→∞ ρ
(n)
j,1 = 0.
In addition, we set limn→∞ γ
(n)
j = γ
†
j ∈ R+. If limn→∞ γ(n)j = 0 or ∞, only symbols in positions with
innocent symbol 0 or 1, respectively, are used to embed covert information. Else, the sequence {γ(n)j } is
bounded, and we can extract a convergent subsequence with limit γ†j . Note that 1 − λ(n)j = nj,0n . Using
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain
n∑
`=1
`:x0j,`=0
(
µ
(n)
j,`
)2
> 1
nj,0
 n∑
`=1
`:x0j,`=0
µ
(n)
j,`

2
, (81)
n∑
`=1
`:x0j,`=1
(
µ
(n)
j,`
)2
> 1
nj,1
 n∑
`=1
`:x0j,`=1
µ
(n)
j,`

2
. (82)
From (77), we continue to bound δn,j by
δn,j >
∑
z
1
2
(
1− ξ(n)j (z)
) n∑
`=1
`:x0j,`=0
(
µ
(n)
j,`
)2 K2(z)
Q0(z)
+
n∑
`=1
`:x0j,`=1
(
µ
(n)
j,`
)2 K2(z)
Q1(z)
 (83)
(a)
>
∑
z
1
2
(
1− ξ(n)j (z)
) 1nj,0
 n∑
`=1
`:x0j,`=0
µ
(n)
j,`

2
K2(z)
Q0(z)
+
1
nj,1
 n∑
`=1
`:x0j,`=1
µ
(n)
j,`

2
K2(z)
Q1(z)
 (84)
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=
∑
z
1
2
(
1− ξ(n)j (z)
)(
nj,0
(
ρ
(n)
j,0
)2 K2(z)
Q0(z)
+ nj,1
(
ρ
(n)
j,1
)2 K2(z)
Q1(z)
)
(85)
=
∑
z
1
2
n
(
ρ
(n)
j,0
)2 (
1− ξ(n)j (z)
)(
(1− λ(n)j )
K2(z)
Q0(z)
+ λ
(n)
j
(
γ
(n)
j
)2 K2(z)
Q1(z)
)
, (86)
where (a) follows from (81) and (82).
We pause the analysis of δn, j here and define constant composition sub-codebooks Fk ⊂ C∗ with type
Pk in which k denotes the weight of the codeword. As there are (n + 1) different types for sequences
{0, 1}n, there are at most (n+ 1) such sub-codebooks. Let us recall that the codebook C∗ is a capacity-
achieving codebook for the channel between Alice and Willie, that is, the rate of the common message
R , logM2n = I
(
Λ,WZ|X
)−δ(n) with limn→∞ δ(n) = 0. Let us assume that ∀k ∈ J1, nK, log|Fk|n 6 R−δ
for any δ > 0. For a δ′ < δ and n large enough,
M2 =
∑
k
|Fk| (87)
6
∑
k
exp (n (R− δ)) (88)
< (n+ 1) exp (n (R− δ)) (89)
< exp
(
n
(
R− δ′)) . (90)
We note that the assumption log|Fk|n 6 R − δ for all k ∈ J1, nK results in a contradiction in (90) since
M2 = exp (nR). Hence, there exists at least one sub-codebook Fk∗ such that
log |Fk∗ |
n
> R− δ (91)
and Pk∗(1) = 1−Pk∗(0) = k∗n ∈ (0, 1). Using [26, Corollary 6.4], we bound the rate of this sub-codebook
for an arbitrary υ > 0 by
log |Fk∗ |
n
< I
(
Pk∗ ,WZ|X
)
+ 2υ. (92)
Combining (91) and (92), we obtain
I
(
Pk∗ ,WZ|X
)
> I
(
Λ,WZ|X
)− δ − 2υ. (93)
Using the unicity of the capacity-achieving input distribution, the concavity of mutual information
and (93), we conclude that the type Pk∗ is arbitrarily close to Λ since δ and υ are arbitrary. Consequently,
we replace λ(n)j with λ
† , λ∗ −  for an arbitrarily small  ∈ R.
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We then bound logM1 using standard converse steps.
logM1 = H(W1|W2 = j) (94)
6 I(W1;Y|W2 = j) +Hb (n,j) + n,j logM1 (95)
6 I(W1X;Y|W2 =j) +Hb (n,j) + n,j logM1 (96)
= I(X;Y|W2 = j) + I(W1;Y|W2 = j,X) +Hb (n,j) + n,j logM1 (97)
(a)
= H(Y|W2 = j)−H(Y|X,W2 = j) +Hb (n,j) + n,j logM1 (98)
(b)
6
n∑
`=1
(H(Y`|W2 = j)−H(Y`|X`,W2 = j)) +Hb (n,j) + n,j logM1 (99)
=
n∑
`=1
I(X`;Y`|W2 = j)+Hb (n,j)+n,j logM1, (100)
where (a) follows from the fact that I(W1;Y|W2 = j,X) = 0, and (b) follows from the fact that
conditioning reduces entropy and the memoryless property of the channel WY |X . Rearranging the terms
in (100), we obtain
logM1 6
∑n
`=1 I(X`;Y`|W2 = j) +Hb (n,j)
1− n,j . (101)
Defining P̂j,` as the distribution of symbol Y` of Y, we upper bound the mutual information term in (101)
by
I(X`;Y`|W2 = j)=
∑
y
((
1− µ(n)j,`
)
P 0j,`(y) log
P 0j,`(y)
P̂j,`(y)
)
+
∑
y
((
µ
(n)
j,`
)
P 1j,`(y) log
P 1j,`(y)
P̂j,`(y)
)
(102)
= µ
(n)
j,` D
(
P 1j,`‖P 0j,`
)− D(P̂j,`‖P 0j,`) (103)
6 µ(n)j,` D
(
P 1j,`‖P 0j,`
)
. (104)
Combining (101) and (104), we obtain
logM1 6
∑n
`=1 µ
(n)
j,` D
(
P 1j,`‖P 0j,`
)
+Hb (n,j)
1− n,j (105)
=
nj,0ρ
(n)
j,0D(P1‖P0)+nj,1ρ(n)j,1D(P0‖P1)+Hb (n,j)
1− n,j (106)
=
nρ
(n)
j,0
(
(1−λ†)D(P1‖P0)+λ†γ(n)j D(P0‖P1)
)
+Hb (n,j)
1− n,j . (107)
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Since limn→∞ logM1 = ∞, (107) imposes that limn→∞ nρ(n)j,0 = ∞. Consequently, from (86), we
conclude that limn→∞
√
nδn,j = ∞. Combining (86), (107), and the facts that limn→∞
√
nδn,j = ∞
and limn→∞Hb (n,j) = 0, we obtain
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nδn,j
6 lim
n→∞
nρ
(n)
j,0
(
(1− λ†)D(P1‖P0) + λ†γ(n)j D(P0‖P1)
)
(1− n,j)
√
n
∑
z
n(ρ(n)j,0 )
2
2
(
1− ξ(n)j (z)
)(
(1− λ†)K2(z)Q0(z) + λ†
(
γ
(n)
j
)2
K2(z)
Q1(z)
)
(108)
=
√
2
(1− λ†)D(P1‖P0) + λ†γ†jD(P0‖P1)√
(1− λ†)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λ†
(
γ†j
)2
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
. (109)
Following standard steps, we lower bound logM1 by
logM1 = H(W1|W2 = j) (110)
> I(W1;Z|W2 = j) (111)
(a)
= H(Z|W2 = j)−H(Z|X,W1,W2 = j) (112)
(b)
> H(Z|W2 = j)−H(Z|X,W2 = j) (113)
=
∑
x
∑
z
Πnj (x)W
⊗n
Z|X(z|x) log
W ⊗nZ|X(z|x)
Q̂nj (z)
(114)
=
n∑
`=1
∑
x
∑
z
Πj,`(x)WZ|X(z|x) log
WZ|X(z|x)
Q0j,`(z)
−δn,j (115)
(c)
>
n∑
`=1
I(X`;Z`|W2 = j)− δn,j , (116)
where (a) follows from the fact that X is a function of (W1,W2), (b) follows from the fact that
conditioning reduces entropy, and (c) follows from the fact that
∑
x Πj,`(x)WZ|X(z|x) = Q̂j,`(z) and
from the fact that KL divergence is non-negative. Continuing the analysis of logM1 by expanding the
mutual information term, we obtain
logM1>
n∑
`=1
∑
z
(
1− µ(n)j,`
)
Q0j,`(z) log
Q0j,`(z)
Q̂j,`(z)
+
n∑
`=1
∑
z
(
µ
(n)
j,`
)
Q1j,`(z) log
Q1j,`(z)
Q̂j,`(z)
− δn,j (117)
>
n∑
`=1
µ
(n)
j,` D
(
Q1j,`‖Q0j,`
)− n∑
`=1
D
(
Q̂j,`‖Q0j,`
)
−δn,j (118)
(a)
>
n∑
`=1
µ
(n)
j,` D
(
Q1j,`‖Q0j,`
)− 2δn,j (119)
=nρ
(n)
j,0
(
(1−λ†)D(Q1‖Q0)+λ†γ(n)j D(Q0‖Q1)
)
−2δn,j , (120)
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where (a) follows from (68). For an arbitrary  ∈ (0, 1), an n large enough, and for any sequence of
codes such that (109) is satisfied with equality,2 we have
√
2
(1− )
(
(1− λ†)D(P1‖P0) + λ†γ†jD(P0‖P1)
)
√
(1− λ†)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) + λ†
(
γ†j
)2
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
6
nρ
(n)
j,0
(
(1− λ†)D(P1‖P0) + λ†γ(n)j D(P0‖P1)
)
+Hb (n,j)
(1− n,j)
√
nδn,j
. (121)
Combining (120), and (121), we obtain
logM1√
nδn,j
>
nρ
(n)
j,0
((
1− λ†)D(Q1‖Q0)+λ†γ(n)j D(Q0‖Q1))√
(1−λ†)χ2 (Q1‖Q0)+λ†
(
γ†j
)2
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
×
√
2(1−n,j)(1− )
(
(1−λ†)D(P1‖P0)+λ†γ†jD(P0‖P1)
)
nρ
(n)
j,0
(
(1−λ†)D(P1‖P0)+λ†γ(n)j D(P0‖P1)
)
+Hb (n,j)
− 2δn,j√
nδn,j
. (122)
Since limn→∞ δn,j = 0, the last term in (122) vanishes in the limit. Since  is arbitrary, on applying
limits to (122), we obtain
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nδn,j
>
√
2
((
1− λ†)D(Q1‖Q0)+λ†γ†jD(Q0‖Q1))√
(1−λ†)χ2 (Q1‖Q0)+λ†
(
γ†j
)2
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)
. (123)
Note that the bounds (109) and (123) still depend on the choice of the common message W2 = j through
γ†j . To eliminate this dependency, we choose an optimal γ
∗ > 0 that maximizes (109) provided the
following condition is satisfied.
(1− λ†)D(P1‖P0) + λ†γ∗D(P0‖P1) > (1− λ†)D(Q1‖Q0) + λ†γ∗D(Q0‖Q1). (124)
Consequently, replacing γ†j with γ
∗ in (109) and (123), we obtain (57) and (58) since  in the definition
of λ† is arbitrary.
The combination of (57) and (58) imposes
(1− λ∗)D(P1‖P0) + λ∗γD(P0‖P1) > (1− λ∗)D(Q1‖Q0) + λ∗γD(Q0‖Q1), (125)
which characterizes the advantage that Bob should possess over Willie to facilitate keyless embedding
of covert bits. Although we normalize logM1 by
√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)
, which depends on the choice of the
common message W2 = j, the bounds on logM1 are independent of j.
2We know that there exists at least one such code from Theorem 1.
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Remark 1. As a special case, let us assume that the channel to Willie is degraded w.r.t. the channel to
Bob. This assumption guarantees that (125) is satisfied as degradedness implies D(P1‖P0) > D(Q1‖Q0)
and D(P0‖P1) > D(Q0‖Q1).
However, the degraded broadcast channel assumption is not a necessary condition to facilitate keyless
covert communication in our case as shown in the following example.
Example 1. Let us consider a discrete memoryless channel
(X ,WZ|X ,Z) with D(P1‖P0) < D(Q1‖Q0)
and D(P0‖P1) > D(Q0‖Q1). Here, the channel WZ|X is not degraded w.r.t. the channel WY |X . Since
all KL divergence terms and λ∗ in (125) are constants determined by the channel, the only degree of
freedom is γ.
Remark 2. For symmetric channels with two inputs, note that D(P1‖P0) = D(P0‖P1), D(Q1‖Q0) =
D(Q0‖Q1), and χ2 (Q1‖Q0) = χ2 (Q0‖Q1). Consequently, from (57) and (58), we obtain
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)6√2 D(P1‖P0)√
χ2 (Q1‖Q0)
, (126)
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)>√2 D(Q1‖Q0)√
χ2 (Q1‖Q0)
, (127)
since γ∗ = 1 and λ∗ = 12 . Note that the covert throughput in (126) matches that of the point-to-
point channel [4]. As a special case, we consider a broadcast setup for BSCs with pB and pW as the
crossover probabilities for the channels from Alice to Bob and Willie, respectively. Assuming pB 6 0.5
and pW 6 0.5 without loss of generality, we obtain
D(P1‖P0) = D(P0‖P1) = (1− 2pB) log
(
1− pB
pB
)
, (128)
D(Q1‖Q0)=D(Q0‖Q1)=(1−2pW ) log
(
1−pW
pW
)
, (129)
χ2 (Q1‖Q0) = χ2 (Q0‖Q1) = (1− 2pW )
2
pW (1− pW ) . (130)
Combining (126) to (130), we obtain
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)6√2pW (1− pW ) 1−2pB1−2pW log
(
1−pB
pB
)
, (131)
lim
n→∞
logM1√
nD
(
Q̂nj ‖Qnj
)>√2pW (1− pW ) log(1− pWpW
)
. (132)
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Note that keyless covert communication is achievable in this channel model iff
(1−2pB) log
(
1−pB
pB
)
>(1−2pW ) log
(
1−pW
pW
)
. (133)
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since Q⊗nx,αn,βn is an n-fold distribution, we write Q
⊗n
x,αn,βn
=
∏n
i=1Qxi,αn,βn . We now analyze the
KL divergence between Q⊗nx,αn,βn and Q
⊗n
x,0,0.
D
(
Q⊗nx,αn,βn‖Q⊗nx,0,0
)
=
n∑
i=1
D
(
Qxi,αn,βn‖WZ|X=xi
)
(134)
= n (1− λn)D
(
Q0,αn,βn‖Q0
)
+ nλnD
(
Q1,αn,βn‖Q1
)
. (135)
For k ∈ N∗ and two distributions defined on the same alphabet Z , we define χk (P‖Q) ,
∑
z
(P (z)−Q(z))k
Qk−1(z)
and ηk (P‖Q) ,
∑
z:P (z)−Q(z)<0
(P (z)−Q(z))k
Qk−1(z) . Then, using [4, Lemma 1], we upper bound each of the
two KL divergence terms in (135) by
D
(
Q0,αn,βn‖Q0
)
6 α
2
n
2
χ2 (Q1‖Q0)− α
3
n
6
χ3 (Q1‖Q0) + α
4
n
3
χ4 (Q1‖Q0) , (136)
D
(
Q1,αn,βn‖Q1
)
6 β
2
n
2
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)− β
3
n
6
χ3 (Q0‖Q1) + β
4
n
3
χ4 (Q0‖Q1) , (137)
For n large enough, using [4, Lemma 1], we lower bound the two KL divergence terms in (135) by
D
(
Q0,αn,βn‖Q0
)
> α
2
n
2
χ2 (Q1‖Q0)− α3n
(
1
2
χ3 (Q1‖Q0)− 2
3
η3 (Q1‖Q0)
)
+
2α4n
3
η4 (Q1‖Q0) , (138)
D
(
Q1,αn,βn‖Q1
)
> β
2
n
2
χ2 (Q0‖Q1)− β3n
(
1
2
χ3 (Q0‖Q1)− 2
3
η3 (Q0‖Q1)
)
+
2β4n
3
η4 (Q0‖Q1) . (139)
Loosening the bounds in (136)-(139), for n large enough, we obtain
α2n
2
(1 +
√
αn)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) > D
(
Q0,αn,βn‖Q0
)
> α
2
n
2
(1−√αn)χ2 (Q1‖Q0) , (140)
β2n
2
(
1 +
√
βn
)
χ2 (Q0‖Q1) > D
(
Q1,αn,βn‖Q1
)
> β
2
n
2
(
1−
√
βn
)
χ2 (Q0‖Q1) . (141)
Ultimately, combining (135), (140), and (141), we obtain (14).
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We denote the covert transmission status of Alice by T , 1 − 1{W1 = 0} and Bob’s estimate of T
by T̂ . For j ∈ J1,M2K and x0j ∈ C2, define
Anγj ,
{
(x,y) ∈ X n × Yn : log
W ⊗nY |X (y,x)
P ⊗nx0j ,αn,βn(y)
> γj
}
, (142)
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where γj > 0 will be determined later. The decoder at Bob operates as follows
• if ∃ unique i such that (xij ,y) ∈ Anγj , output Ŵ1 = i,
• else if 6 ∃ i such that (xij ,y) ∈ Anγj , output Ŵ1 = 0,
• else, declare a decoding error.
Define the event Eij ,
{
(Xij ,Y) ∈ Anγj
}
. We also define
E1,EC
 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
∑
t′∈{0,1}
P
(
T̂ 6= t′
∣∣∣t= t′, Ŵ2 =W2 =j)
 , (143)
E2,EC
 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
P
(̂
W1 6=W1
∣∣∣Ŵ2 =W2 =j, T̂ = t=1)
 . (144)
The error probability of the covert message averaged over all choices of the codebook C can be written
as
EC
 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
P
(1)
e,2,j
 = E1 + E2. (145)
From the definition of E1, we obtain
E1 =EC
 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
P
(
T̂ =0
∣∣∣t=1, Ŵ2 =W2 =j)
+EC
 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
P
(
T̂ =1
∣∣∣t=0, Ŵ2 =W2 =j)
 . (146)
We upper bound the first term in (146) by
EC
 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
P
(
T̂ =0
∣∣∣t=1, Ŵ2 =W2 =j)
 = EC
 1
M1M2
M2∑
j=1
M1∑
i=1
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|Xij)1
{⋂
i′
Eci′j
}
(147)
(a)
6 EC
 1
M1M2
M2∑
j=1
M1∑
i=1
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X (y|Xij)1
{
Ecij
}
(148)
=
1
M2
M2∑
j=1
∑
x0j
PnX (x0j)PW ⊗nY |XΠx0j ,αn,βn
((
Anγj
)c)
,
(149)
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where (a) follows from the fact that the probability of intersection of several events does not exceed the
probability of one of those events. We bound the second term in (146) by
EC
 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
P
(
T̂ =1
∣∣∣t=0, Ŵ2 =W2 =j)

= EC
 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X (y|X0j)1
{⋃
i
Eij
} (150)
(a)
6 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
∑
x0j
PnX (x0j)
M1∑
i=1
∑
y
∑
xij
W ⊗nY |X(y|x0j)Πx0j ,αn,βn(xij)1
{
(xij ,y)∈Anγj
}
(151)
6 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
∑
x0j
PnX (x0j)M1e
−γj∑
y
∑
x1j
W ⊗nY |X(y|x1j)
P ⊗nx0j ,αn,βn(y)
W ⊗nY |X (y|x0j) Πx0j ,αn,βn (x1j) (152)
(b)
6 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
M1e
−γj , (153)
where (a) follows from the union bound and (b) follows from the fact that
∑
x1j
W ⊗nY |X (y|x1j) Πx0j ,αn,βn (x1j) =
P ⊗nx0j ,αn,βn (y) and the definition of Anγj . We then bound the second term in (145) by
E2
(a)
6 EC
 1
M1M2
M2∑
j=1
M1∑
i=1
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X (y|Xij)1
{
Ecij
}
+EC
 1M1M2
M2∑
j=1
M1∑
i=1
M1∑
i′=1
i′ 6=i
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|Xij)1{Ei′j}
 , (154)
where (a) follows from the union bound. We upper bound the second term in (154) by
EC
 1M1M2
M2∑
j=1
M1∑
i=1
M1∑
i′=1
i′ 6=i
∑
y
W ⊗nY |X(y|Xij)1{Ei′j}

6M1
M2
M2∑
j=1
∑
x0j
PnX (x0j)
∑
y
∑
x1j
P ⊗nx0j ,αn,βn(y)Πx0j ,αn,βn (x1j)1
{
(x1j ,y) ∈ Anγj
}
(155)
6 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
M1e
−γj . (156)
24
Define γj , (1− δ)
∑n
i=1 I
(
Xi;Yi|Xi = x0j,i
)
for an arbitrary δ ∈ (0, 1). Expanding I(Xi;Yi|Xi = x0j,i),
we obtain
I
(
Xi;Yi|Xi = x0j,i
)
=
(∑
y
(1− αn)P0(y) log P0(y)
P 0,αn,βn(y)
+
∑
y
αnP1(y) log
P1(y)
P 0,αn,βn(y)
)
1{x0j,i = 0}
+
(∑
y
βnP0(y) log
P0(y)
P 1,αn,βn(y)
+
∑
y
(1− βn)P1(y) log P1(y)
P 1,αn,βn(y)
)
1{x0j,i = 1} (157)
=
(
αnD(P1‖P0)−D
(
P 0,αn,βn‖P0
))
1{x0j,i=0}+
(
βnD(P0‖P1)−D
(
P 1,αn,βn‖P1
))
1{x0j,i=1}
(158)
(a)
=
(
αnD(P1‖P0) +O
(
α2n
))
1{x0j,i = 0}+
(
βnD(P0‖P1) +O
(
β2n
))
1{x0j,i = 1} . (159)
where (a) follows from combining (136), (137), (138), and (139), in the proof of Lemma 1. Aggregating
the n mutual information terms corresponding to each symbol position, we obtain
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xi;Yi|Xi = x0j,i
)
= n ((1− λj)αnD(P1‖P0) + λjβnD(P0‖P1)) + nO
(
α2n
)
+ nO (β2n) . (160)
We bound the probability term in (149) by
PW ⊗nY |XΠx0j ,αn,βn
((
Anγj
)c) (a)
6 exp (−ζ1nαn)+exp (−ζ1nβn) , (161)
for an appropriate ζ1 > 0, where (a) follows from using Bernstein’s inequality as in [7, Appendix D].
Then, combining (145), (146), (148), (149), (153), (154), (156), and (161), we infer that (38) is satisfied
for a large n and appropriate constant ξ2 > 0 if, for every j ∈ J1,M2K, logM1 satisfies
logM1 < (1− δ)n ((1− λj)αnD(P1‖P0) + λjβnD(P0‖P1)) + nO
(
α2n
)
+ nO (β2n) . (162)
However, since λj is arbitrarily close to λ∗ and δ is arbitrary, it is sufficient if logM1 satisfies (37).
APPENDIX C
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For W2 = j and x0j ∈ C2, define the set
Bnτj ,
{
(x, z) ∈ X n ×Zn : log
W ⊗nZ|X (z|x)
Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn (z)
6 τj
}
, (163)
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where τj > 0 will be determined later. For a fixed j and i ∈ J1,M1K, the expectation over all random
codewords {Xkj}k∈J1,M1K\{i} is denoted by E∼i. We bound the KL divergence between Q̂nW2 and
Q⊗nx0W2 ,αn,βn
averaged over all choices of the common message W2 and the codebook by
EC
(
EW2D
(
Q̂nW2‖Q⊗nX0W2 ,αn,βn
))
= EC
 1
M2
M2∑
j=1
∑
z
1
M1
M1∑
i=1
W ⊗nZ|X (z|Xij) log
∑M1
k=1W
⊗n
Z|X (z|Xkj)
M1Q
⊗n
X0j ,αn,βn
(z)
 (164)
=
1
M1M2
M2∑
j=1
M1∑
i=1
∑
x0j
PnX (x0j)
∑
z
∑
xij
W ⊗nZ|X(z|xij)Πx0j ,αn,βn(xij)
×E∼i
log

∑M1
k=1
k 6=i
W ⊗nZ|X(z|Xkj)
M1Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
(z)
+
W ⊗nZ|X (z|xij)
M1Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
(z)

 (165)
(a)
6 1
M1M2
M2∑
j=1
M1∑
i=1
∑
x0j
PnX (x0j)
∑
z
∑
xij
W ⊗nZ|X(z|xij)Πx0j ,αn,βn(xij)
× logE∼i

∑M1
k=1
k 6=i
W ⊗nZ|X(z|Xkj)
M1Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
(z)
+
W ⊗nZ|X (z|xij)
M1Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
(z)
 , (166)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality. Defining µ(n)min , min {(1− αn) minz Q0(z), (1− βn) minz Q1(z)},
we bound the log term in (166) by
logE∼i

∑M1
k=1
k 6=i
W ⊗nZ|X(z|Xkj)
M1Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
(z)
+
W ⊗nZ|X (z|xij)
M1Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
(z)

=log

∑M1
k=1
k 6=i
∑
xkj
W ⊗nZ|X(z|xkj) Πx0j ,αn,βn(xkj)
M1Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
(z)
+
W ⊗nZ|X (z|xij)
M1Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
(z)
 (167)
(a)
6 log
(
1 +
W ⊗nZ|X (z|xij)
M1Q
⊗n
x0j ,αn,βn
(z)
)
(168)
6 log
(
1 +
eτj
M1
)
+ log
(
1 +
1
Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn (z)
)
1
{
(xij , z) 6∈ Bnτj
}
(169)
6 e
τj
M1
+ n log
(
2
µ
(n)
min
)
1
{
(xij , z) 6∈ Bnτj
}
(170)
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where (a) follows from the fact that
∑
xkj
W ⊗nZ|X (z|xkj) Πx0j ,αn,βn (xkj) = Q⊗nx0j ,αn,βn (z). Combin-
ing (166) and (170), we obtain
EC
(
EW2D
(
Q̂nW2‖Q⊗nX0W2 ,αn,βn
))
6 n log
(
2
µ
(n)
min
)
1
M2
M2∑
j=1
∑
x0j
PnX (x0j)PW ⊗nZ|XΠx0j ,αn,βn
((
Bnτj
)c)
+
1
M2
M2∑
j=1
eτj
M1
. (171)
Using steps similar to those used to obtain (160) in Appendix B, we obtain
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xi;Zi|Xi = x0j,i
)
= n ((1− λj)αnD(Q1‖Q0) + λjβnD(Q0‖Q1)) + nO
(
α2n
)
+ nO (β2n)
(172)
Defining τj , (1 + δ)
∑n
i=1 I
(
Xi;Zi|Xi = x0j,i
)
for an arbitrary δ > 0, we bound the probability term
on the right hand side of (171) using Bernstein’s inequality by
PW ⊗nZ|XΠx0j ,αn,βn
((
Bnτj
)c)
6exp(−ζ2nαn)+exp(−ζ2nβn), (173)
for an appropriate ζ2 > 0. Consequently, combining (171) and (173) and ensuring3 logM1 satisfies (39)
for an arbitrary ν ∈ (0, 1) and a large n, we conclude that there exists a constant ξ3 > 0 such that (40)
is satisfied.
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